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. We are so accustomed to thinking of knowledge, and the gathering of 
It, as unqualifiedly good, that even faithful Christians and Jews are prone 
to forget that their scriptures depict the quest _ for knowledge as a 
so~ce of tragic separation from God. For Christians, the human 
cho1ce for the unqualified pursuit of knowledge is what required 
God's repair of creation through the saving power of Christ. 
. The reminder of our tragic relation to the quest to know everything 
HIS graphically portrayed in the second and third chapters of Genesis. ere is the account of the creation of . man and woman and of a 
wonderful garden. Of its lovely fruit they may freely eat, but not of 
~ne tree- the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. To eat of that 
pe eet m~s deat~. But Adam and Eve, beguiled by the charming ser-
n ~ ' did eat of 1t and the results are with us still. Our earthly life is 
.: a perfect paradise without pain and sweat. Above all, they and we 
~ separated from the tree of life and are mortal, not able on our own 
wer to live eternally. 
a gBu~ is knowledge really to be regarded as forbidden fruit? How can 
a good ~u~h as knowledge be so regarded? Is knowledge, often seen as 
lesso;vil~n Itself, ever to be seen as evil in itself, and the desire for it, no 
fru~a~ has prompted me to dare consider any knowledge, that sacred 
What~ scholars' treasured labors, as, in any sense, to be forbidden? 
spendi~ol would ~ttack a growth industry like researc~?.Governme~t 
1940, t~ for m~1~al research alone soared from 18 million dollars m 
three bil/40 milhon. dollars in 1950, and from there to more than 
strong ion dollars m 1979. The lure of forbidden fruit is rather 
less, onast~ven Eden'~ owner and manager soon discovered. N everthe-
e assumptiOn that David really beat Goliath, I will fashion 
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my small slingshot and aim it at that rich and industrious giar 
edge. 
, know!· 
Now do not misunderstand me. I have always been a con 
member of the knowledge business. I work hard to justify 
by gathering and sharing knowledge. I have slept peacefully 
that knowledge and the pursuit of it are good. But these 
slumbers have been disturbed by the roaring waves of res 
dreams, and nightmarish events. 
:ientious 
1y salary 
elieving 
fogmatic 
trch, bad 
First, Daniel Callahan, commenting· upon what he Cf 
Moral Career of Genetic Engineering," noted that there ap 
no "culturally persuasive" arguments against each next w 
etic research being proposed. 1 On the one hand, there 
research of the very kind essential to creating the worlds dr: 
Orwell's 1984 and Huxley's Brave New World. Virtual! 
shrinks from these worlds. Yet, on the other hand, every 1 
research proposal promises beneficial results , ranging from 
cancer to increased food production beyond belief. And, 
time, the genuine risks of entering the worlds depicted by 
Huxley are discounted as obscurantist fear of the new. , 
pursuit of knowledge becomes a virtually uncontestable gc 
scientists argue for the freedom to do research unimpeded . 
'Haunting' Ideal Observer Theory 
ed "The 
ear to be 
e of gen· 
s genetic 
1atized in 
everyone 
w genetic 
.1e cure of 
the same 
)rwell and 
1d so, the 
d . Indeed, 
Aroused by this, only for a time, I fell asleep again. } J.t by now 1 
was vulnerable to a bad dream. The Ideal Observer Theor ; , a longtiJne 
source of comfort, began to haunt my sleep. 2 The Il 2al Observer 
Theory depicts knowledge as logically and practically 1ecessarY for 
discerning right and wrong. Furthermore, there is n o limit to t~~ 
amount necessary . Nothing less than omniscience guara. Gees our ab 1 ity to discover moral truths. Should we not therefore, regard the ques 
for knowledge not only as a good, but also as a sacred duty? ReallY· 
though, how far do we think we can move down the road to om~: 
cience? Only God can know everything. Note, however , t he pr~ble!ll; 
not that we are limited to something short of omniscience. It_ IS ra~be 
that we set as our goal to become as much like God as possibl_e. the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil emerged in this dream with_ nt 
disturbing thought that we, in ethics, are embarked on the anclelt 
venture to become like God, knowing good and evil. Yet,. this 1d0 ~ 
trous activity comes clothed in an argument from necessity, agaJO 
which an appeal to Eden's disaster appears hopelessly quixotic . ired 
Even such bad dreams failed to arouse me. Finally, it requ uld 
nightmares . There are always those who have argued that you shO wl· 
not and cannot stop the curiosity which fuels the gathering of kno aJI. 
edge . I have always regarded such arguments as disingenuous. After 
even though we have seen what shocking expe.riments were perpetrated 
by Nazi physicians, those atrocities were declared to be criminal under 
the Nuremberg Code. And, even though Henry Beecher in 1966 found 
22 American studies in violation of that code, the government has 
responded by regulating the research it funds . 3 If someone would 
assert, nevertheless, that gross violations will continue because people 
will do whatever can be done, I had a standard reply: People do not 
do whatever can be done. For example, research scientists do not chop 
up people systematically to discover what happens . That is what trig-
?ered the nightmare. Recently, it was revealed that the Japanese, dur-
mg World War II, systematically removed the organs of prisoners to 
lear~ exactly what occurs as this is done, and how vital each organ is 
to hfe. That ended my dogmatic slumbers. I am now well aware that 
there is a serpent in our midst, pushing research in genetics toward the 
. realization of our worst fears, while beguiling us in the belief that the 
need for knowledge is necessarily limitless and good , a veritable path 
to Eden. And, at the same time, the most unthinkable brutalities have 
already been done in the context of research, placing us well outside 
of Eden. · · 
kn I believe we are compelled by logical and practical necessity to limit 
·know ledge and the gathering of it. The usual arguments for limiting 
.owledge are that only bad results, bad usages, bad applications, and e~I c?ncomita~ts of research, such as injury to humans, may block 
w at ls otherwise good to find out and to be in the business of finding 
out I w t t 
· . an . o argue, to the contrary, that some knowledge and some ~ursutts of 1t are evil as such. For us, as humans there is evil knowl-
ge and quests for knowledge that ought to be f~rbidden. 
c For my purpose, it is not important to argue for some definitive 
s:~~~ti?n of knowledge, if such there even be. I will dwell on 
g 
1 lc Instances of knowledge for the sake of each argument. In 
eneral wh t '11 
ca bl ' a WI count as knowledge are claims that are tested or pae fb · ' 
con ° emg tested, by methods of observation, experiment, and 
ceptual anal · h. . aga· . ys1s w 1ch people are persuaded will count for or 
is nm~tththe drums being put forth. Knowledge, on this understanding 
et er total! · ' llleth d Y certam nor totally complete. New claims and new 
the 0~ s ma~ or may not discredit past claims and past methods, and kno 1 serva~10ns and concepts on which these are based. This view of F"! edge mcludes religious knowledge. 
kno:!dt~en, is ~nowledge ever evil in itself? In one sense, there is 
ethical / that IS always good to have. For example, the more non-
ideal b acts I know, the better I can decide what is right. Hence, an 
a bett~r :rver ?ad best be omniscient, and God, Who is omniscient, is 
oral JUdge than I can ever be. 
But what ab t th " . . through . . ou e knowledge" obtamed about non-ethical facts 
Paradox ~ru~mal ~cts, such as murder, rape , or torture? Here the 
eg~ns. GIVen the fact that crime in Boston was down in 
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Spring 1983 and yet rape was up by more than 30 per cent, < 
why these rapes occur might help us prevent them. The kn 
rape events would seem to be beneficial. Nevertheless, the ra 
yield such knowledge are terribly evil in themselves. In the 
possible worlds, we would have no rapes to study. Some 
should never experience and yet these same experiences , ' 
occur should be well studied, and the results well knowr 
used to prevent the knowledge gained from the experienc< 
The paradox here can only be resolved if we make use of a 
once made by Bertrand Russell, namely the distinctiO! 
knowlege by description and knowledge by acquaintancE 
tions of events, past, present and future, whether these 
good or evil, can be seen as always good, insofar as these c 
assist us in choosing what is right, and in increasing our ch 
Lack of Knowledge Sometimes Good 
:t udy of 
ledge of 
·s which 
~ st of all 
1ings we . 
I 
ten they 
m d well 1 
of rape. 
>t inction 
between 
Descrip· 
1ents are 
criptions 
•s. 
1 this case 
d to yield 
deaths, at 
Take the knowledge of what happened at Hiroshima. 
the tree of knowledge as descriptive knowledge can be u 
the same fruit as the tree of life, for the sake of prevent iJ 
least in the context of earthly life. Yet, it is better still r 
out precisely what happens when atomic weapons an 
knowledge, like rape, with which one ideally should n 
acquainted, just as Cain should never have found out w 
1er to find 
sed. It ~ 
er become 
, t it is like, 
and what occurs during and after one murders one's brot 1 r. 'b 
' . ~ ~-Interestingly enough, Gerhard Von Rad, when discus .ng e e 
lical account (in Genesis, Chapters 2 and 3) of the tree • kn~~ledg . 
of good and evil, distinguishes "intellectual knowing" f om ~xperf 
iencing" or a "becoming acquainted with." 5 It is this l ,,ter kind 0 
knowing, i.e ., "experiencing," which is the meaning of the Beb:~ 
word (yd) that describes the "knowledge" Adam and E\ would od 
did obtain obtain from eating of the tree of the knowit·dge _of go as 
and evil. They experienced, became acquainted with evil ;w t s1m~ly aD 
something to be described, but as something which haopened m 
activity they chose to do, and yet could have chosen not to. do . d an 
At this poi~t, we see the .di~ferenc~ between human ~emgs; that 
omniscient bemg. An ommsc1ent bemg knows everythmg, a me 
b . . b t will co includes any evil that has come a out, 1s commg a ou ' elY 
about and might come about "if." All of this can be kn own p~r gle 
, . . . ause a sin descriptively without choosmg to sanctw~, engage m , or c knoll'fl 
evil event. Evil occasioned by human cho1ces can only become t one 
descriptively to human beings, if and only if and when, at leas il ba5 
person actively engages in perpetrating the evil. Only once the evt per· 
been done or is being done, does knowledge describable by tha 
son and others become available. 
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The person who is responsible for some evil knowledge by acquain-
tance need not be the object of the descriptive knowledge generated. 
The Japanese scientists who systematically removed organs from 
World War II prisoners were doing what is forbidden, namely generat-
ing evil events, and making the observations and analyses that pro-
vided them and us with evil knowledge. Not only is what they did evil, 
but it is also evil that anyone should experience, know by acquain-
tance, what these scientists were learnipg. Knowledge of what hap-
pened to those prisoners is, as knowledge by acquaintance, evil knowl-
edge. However, given that the experiments have been done, descriptive 
knowledge of them may be viewed as good to have, use, teach, and 
analyze. That descriptive knowledge might hopefully help prevent any 
future experiments like them. Also, there may indeed be medical ben-
efits to learn. Even so, sheer curiosity about exactly what took place 
need not be viewed as in the slightest evil in itself. But, the point is, 
the experience of those events is an evil experience and choosing such 
experiences should be regarded as seeking knowledge which is evil and 
should be forbidden. Scientific knowledge of this kind is evil in the 
same way and for the same reason that carnal knowledge which consti-
. ~utes rape is evil. No desire or alleged need for such know ledge makes 
1t good. 
Some knowledge is evil, but it is evil as knowl~dge by acquaintance, 
not as knowledge described by someone who bears no responsibility 
f~r initiating, observing, permitting, or otherwise making possible 
firsthand acquaintance with such evil. 
_T~e failure to recognize in what sense knowledge may in itself be 
evil Is surely one very important reason for our inability to see that 
~me knowledge should not be sought at all. Consider research using 
umans and control groups whose members are unaware that they are 
notre · · tes Ce1Vlng either the standard treatment or the new treatment being 
st ted. When the question was raised at a conference as to when to 
~ an experiment in which some of these untreated people were 
~ ut to die, some American scientists contended that the experiment 
8 
ould not be stopped, even if some people died, until there were 
~ugh cases to obtain statistically significant results . To do other-
! 'they argued, was to render the results of the experiment worth-
ees:· If completed, the experiment would be good! I and others pres-
; SP<>ke against the sacrifice of innocent lives to achieve such a good. 
w~ one _argued that the very knowledge of what happens when people 
kn os~ hves could be saved are allowed to die is evil. In other words, 
PreOWing ~ what happens to someone while dying, whose dying I can 
· Wo~~t, ls ~no~ing something that should be forbidden. The scientists 
even 
0 
be r!g~t m arguing that the results of a controlled experiment, 
are . ne WhiCh causes preventable deaths, is valuable once the results 
tau~~· and right . even in arguing that such results should be used, 
'and not Withheld from any curious scrutiny. Descriptive, intel-
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lectual knowledge of such an experiment may indeed be 
good in itself even though the experiment is evil, and all 1 
being experienced by those who can be held reponsible f 
happening is also evil. 
~wed as 
)Wledge 
what is 
e exper-
rything 
;ood and 
1le for us 
generate 
dent, so 
,rolved in 
1 out. All 
'lave hap· 
.nniscient 
mportant 
ate evil in 
verything, 
ated. Yet 
I have argued so far that some knowledge is evil becaust> 
ience of it is evil in itself and avoidable. At the same time, 
that has already happened, good or evil, may be considere 
even necessary as knowledge for being as moral as it is po> 
to be. Omniscience as an ideal state does not require one 
any evil. As Peter Martin, a Harvard Divinity School 
astutely called to my attention, an omniscient being is not 
any process of gathering knowledge or choosing what to J 
of reality and all of what "might happen if" and "mig! 
pened if" is present to one who knows everything. An 
being is different from an ordinary mortal in this ver 
respect, and there is no necessity for such a being to ger 
order to know everything. Humans ought not to knO\<\ 
because :some knowing is evil to choose as we have in· 
such avoided evil is known, at least as a possibility by a 
being. God, then, can be both good, and know all gooc' 
Finite human beings, however, ought not to seek the evil 
tree of the knowledge of all actual, and all possible, good 
Jmniscient 
·1d all evil. 
,rne by the 
·d evil. 
>r evil state 
. generated, 
e is another 
So far, I have set no limit to the knowledge of any goo 
of affairs which already exists, provided that it is knov 
used, and taught in otherwise moral ways. However, t h· 
kind of limit to all knowledge, good knowledge as wel l We are not, 
and cannot be, omniscient. This, I wish to argue, meam ot only that 
we cannot realistically work to become omniscient, but .. ilso that we 
·t neces· ought not to do so. This may seem like a strange, even '·"' I e un 
sary point to make. I wish to show that it is very 1' ·cessary con· 
sciously to opt against seeking omnis~ie.nce. . all 
The fact is people do treat ommscience as an Idect. and actu Y 
make use of what cannot ~e known. Thi~ t~kes place 1:1 at lea~t t~~ 
ways: in the use of certam consequentiahst form s o l reasonmg th 
decide what is right or wrong; and in certain proposals settmg for 
the ideal cognitive processes for deciding what is right or wrong. 
To Operate or Not 
. . . . I was First let us look at trymg to make god-hke moral decisiOns: nd 
' . . d addict a once presented with the followmg case. A woman, a rug save 
pusher, came to a hospital needing a heart operation urgentlyi~~rablY 
her life. The prospect ~as that ~he would. probably l1ve consne oper· 
longer with the operation and die soon wit hout It . Should 0 hoW· 
ate? I maintained one should. The doctor presen ting the case, 
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ever, replied, "Wait a minute . The eminent ethicist, Joseph Fletcher, 
counseled us not to treat this woman unless she agreed to stop taking 
drugs and pushing them; think of all the young people this woman 
may injure or even kill, " he argued. "When asked, she would not 
agree, however, to give up drugs or give up pushing them . Now, would 
you still recommend treatment?" 
I then asked this physician whether drug addiction is a medical 
problem. He replied that it is. Then I asked whether he , as a doctor, is 
a minister of hope. He said he was. "Well then," I said, "treat this 
woman to save her life and overcome her problems." As it turned out, 
this woman was treated and her life saved. Furthermore, she gave up 
her drug addiction and drug pushing, but she soon died. In fact , not a 
single prediction used by Fletcher to counsel non-treatment was cor-
rect. 
That Fletcher's predictions actually were incorrect is not my present 
concern. My contention is rather that one cannot, and ought not, 
~ake use of the predictions based on this woman's drug-related behav-
Ior. It is simply true that no one can or should predict that she will 
always use and sell drugs. There is no way of knowing this, and one 
should not lock her into this as an inevitable, or even likely, perma-
nent condition of her life. Indeed, one should work to change her life 
for the better, and that requires her to be saved, as does also the sheer 
value of her life as such. 
.Joseph Fletcher is trying td inject into moral decision-making some-
thmg that does not at all belong there, namely predictions of individ-~. behavior based on the probability that the individual will do what 
18 hkely or typical of some aggregate pattern in which the individual 
can, a~ least temporarily, be located. Even worse in this case, there was 
no scientific basis for assuming that drug addicts and pushers, who r~o!ess to find that what they do is desirable, are likely to continue 
fe: activities. But decisions regarding the fate of individuals all too 0 T n ta~e the form exhibited here by Fletcher. 
80 ake JUdgments as to whether to use a scarce medical resource for 
a ~eone 65 or someone 40. At the time a hospital in England posted 
thstgn not to resuscitate anyone over 65, what to do was clear- rescue 
doe person who is 40, forget the person who is 65. (The sign came 
as wn,. by the way, after much publicity, and one doctor was quoted thesa~mg that we should not have made the policy public by posting 
hav stgn.) When it is argued, and it frequently is, that persons at 40 
tha:'. 0 n average, a higher remaining life expectancy than someone 65, S(>ecif~ ~rue. But it is not relevant for deciding whether to save a 
.
1c Individual who is 65. 
It 1S inte t· 
of his l'f ~es mg to note that Winston Churchill was in the 65th year 
benen 1de In 1939. Throughout World War II, Britain and its allies 
that ~ ~ f fro~ the masterful leadership of someone over 65 who, if 
ne Pohcy of that English hospital were to be followed, would 
AUgust, 1985 
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not be a candidate for resuscitation had he needed it prior t o 
his leadership role. Many people live much longer after 65 
people after 40 and they certainly may live very well. Am 
professor emeritus at Harvard Divinity School, continues t 
though he has lived more than 80 years. At a recent gathe1 
ing him as a teacher, he remarked wryly, " If I had known 1 
to live so long, I would have taken better care of myself. " ' 
ledge of how long and how well a specific individual will 
available to us to use. Why some insist on claiming and 
"knowledge" is beyond me. But it is immoral. 
Von Rad explicitly notes that the expression "knowin 
evil" as applied to the tree of knowledge, refers to kno 
thing.s Desiring the fruit of this tree, he claims, is a desir< 
cience, to be like God in this respect. Apparently , W f' 
tempted still, as much as ever, not only to aspire to u 
omniscience, but even to act as if we had already obtained 
Conclusion 
;suming 
m some 
Wilder, 
publish, 
~ honor­
as going 
~ know · 
1e is not 
ing such 
:ood and ' 
1g every· 
)r omnis-
~e sorely 
otainable 
I wish now to conclude with one additional brief c :;ideration. 
Omniscience is an ideal condition for judging correctl} "tat is right 
or wrong. We cannot attain it, but should we not aspire come ever 
closer to this idea? Clearly, there is no logical limit t o tl amountof 
knowledge which is needed to yield absolutely, certain )tal know!· 
edge. Therefore, we shall have to settle for something l€ but surely 
for something as close to omniscience as possible. If on· n eans rnak· 
ing use of all knowledge without seeking to generate e\ knowledge, 
or evil of any other kind, that is harmless enough. But c · shou_ld _no: 
emulate the actual standpoint of being omniscient. . ommscJen 
being needs no enlightenment from others, no dialogu ' and no pro; 
cess over time of learning from the insights and mistak of others ae 
we do in all of the sciences. Therefore, we should not 'link that Vlur 
. ase o can derive from an ideal observer theory how best Lt mere hoW 
knowledge: that we ought to seek such knowledge, Y f) · e~ac~l~d a]s 
we ought to gain more knowledge, no. It is essential tl' 1t ~~d-IVl ~he 
actually build into their efforts to improve their moral, ogmtwn , are 
explicit recognition that individu~ efforts to maximize kn~wle:;~eav· 
as limited here as they would be many knowledge-gathen ng d bY 
ors. Knowledge accumulates , becomes disseminated and correcte ing 
a dialogue among many groups and individuals over ti m_e sp~~eal 
beyond the lifetime of individuals. Omniscience is a l_o g~_c~lly ~ can 
condition for knowing what is moral. As something n o mdiVIdU self. 
attain it is not a goal for individual effort ove time and by ?ne ting 
' prox1rna To be omniscient, one must also be eternal . H~man~ , ap oW bY 
omniscience, that is. knowing as much as it is poss1 ble t o kn 
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this-worldly human effort, will necessarily benefit from the work of 
others, and from their work over time. 
I leave for another essay and another occasion the fascinating topic 
of what processes are ideal for improving moral knowledge. Suffice it 
for now that I have suggested why some knowledge, some knowledge 
gained by direct acquaintance, should be regarded as evil, and hence 
evil to seek; and why some "knowledge," insofar as it is unattainable 
and requires omniscience, should be regarded as evil to use or strive to 
possess. I have convinced at least myself that there is a tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil, and God has rightly ordained that we 
should not eat of it. 
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